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Structural analysis based on complex network theory has been considered promising for security issues of power grids. At the
same time, modern power distribution networks with more Distributed Generations (DGs) and Energy Storage Systems (ESS)
have taken on more challenges in operation and security issues. This paper proposed a dedicated metric named as Power-Supply-
Ability for power distribution networks based on net-ability. Special features of DGs, such as relations of capacities, identification of
effective supply area, and limitation in continuous power supply, have been considered in definition. Furthermore, a novel opinion
is proposed that the extent of improvement for operation and security by adding DGs also depends on the original structure of the
distribution networks.This is an inherent ability of the original networks and could be quantitatively analyzed.Through case studies,
this method has been proved to be effective in identifying potential structural vulnerabilities of distribution networks; particularly
the impact of DGs on security has been studied. Furthermore, it can help in site selection for DGs by providing different priorities
of locations compared with results of other works.This can help to complement other methods to construct a more comprehensive
methodology by considering aspects of security, economy, and quality.
1. Introduction
Thenetworks of power system, also named as power grids, are
a critical infrastructure in modern social livings [1]. Serious
outages of electrical power systems can impact the whole
society [2, 3]. For instance, recent blackouts have occurred
in the USA and Europe directly causing losses up to billions
of dollars [4]. These serious consequences have drawn much
attention to electrical security problems such as accidental or
intentional attacks [4, 5].
However, with the increasing size and complexity in
power grids [6], as well as increased consumption of power
and other social developments, it is becoming more difficult
and complex to analyze a large scale of whole power system
and the complicated interconnectivity precludes us from
understanding and evaluating an overall power system [6].
Complex network theory is a popular method to analyze
networked systems in terms of a set of lines with connected
nodes and fortunately recent studies have found that several
properties of complex network (CN), such as small-world
[7] and the characterization of scale-free [8], were related to
power networks. It then allows structural analysis of power
grids through pure topological metrics and brings a new
analyzing method to overcome the above problems [9, 10]. In
the theory of CN, Global Efficiency is a metric to measure
the efficiency of the network for information transmission
between vertices [10] and later is popularly referred to in
assessing the vulnerability of power grids [5, 11–15]. Fur-
thermore, with consideration of specific features in electrical
engineering, it was updated as net-ability to evaluate power
transmission networks [2, 4]. Based on complex network
concept, net-ability analyzes the performance of transmission
networks through considering extra physical features such as
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power flow limits, electrical distance, and contributions of all
involved transmission paths.
Although net-ability is effective in analyzing power trans-
mission networks, due to different structural features among
transmission and modern distribution networks, it could
not be directly utilized for modern distribution networks.
In conventional distribution networks, the main differences
from transmission networks are their radial topology and
impedance to resistance ratio. But it is not a problem for
complex network theory to analyze any network structure
including radial topology, and it is not a problem to adapt
net-ability with appropriate impedance model. However, in
modern power distribution networks, Distributed Gener-
ation (DG) and energy storage devices may increase its
complexity. DGs, simply defined as small-scale electricity
generation within distribution networks or on the customer
side of the networks, are currently undergoing an increasing
amount to relieve environmental problems, such as green-
house gases from traditional electricity generation [16–23].
There are various categories of DGs, such as photovoltaic
cells installed at homes or wind turbines on a farm land.
Although these DGs could improve power supply to local
loads, compared to conventional generation, they are highly
dependent on climates or weather and could not provide
continuous electricity [16, 17]. So battery Energy Storage
Systems (BESS) can also be widely applied to improve power
stability and demand/supply balance [17].
Up to now, to our best knowledge, few papers have
considered direct applying of complex network approaches
for analyzing modern distribution networks, especially to
include impacts from DG and BESS. By comparing with
conventional power distribution stations, [24, 25] consider
DG with relevant small capacity and being placed to load
node. Reference [24] pointed out that the power supply per-
formance of DG should decrease rapidly with the increases
of distance. Based on complex network concept, they raise
some metrics to reflect that DG performance would decrease
rapidly with increase of distance. The metrics used expo-
nential form to show that DG contributed more power
to relatively local load demand and less to remote loads,
but exponential form cannot be fully justified and specific
electrical features, such as impedance, power capacities of
different devices, and contribution of different paths, were not
fully considered. In this paper, the main impacts from DG
on structural analysis of distribution networks are considered
according to the channel capacity, supplying distance as well
as intermittency and fluctuation of primary energy.Thesewill
be discussed in detail in Sections 2 and 3.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: global efficiency
and net-ability will be discussed with their limitations for
applying in distribution networks in Section 2. In Section 3,
a new concept of Power-Supply-Ability (PSA) and its appli-
cation in evaluating power distribution networks will be
proposed. In Section 4, a novel opinion will be discussed
to evaluate the inherent ability of original network structure
to be improved by adding DGs. Simulation and results
of application of PSA are shown in Section 5 with some
examples and Section 6 contains some conclusions.
2. From Global Efficiency to Net-Ability
Global efficiency from the CN theory was initially defined
by Latora [2, 4, 10] and was later widely used to evaluate
performance of network, such as vulnerability assessment or
location of critical components [4, 26]. It was also utilized in
analyzing cascading failures for assessing power systems [27–
29]. The definition for global efficiency can be written as
𝐸 (Y) = 1𝑁 (𝑁 − 1)∑𝑖 ̸=𝑗
1𝑑𝑖𝑗 . (1)
𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance (length of the shortest path) between the
pair of node 𝑖 and node 𝑗, and 𝑁 is the number of all nodes
in the network. This formula is aimed at measuring network
efficiency of information transmission by considering that the
efficiency for sending information between a pair of nodes𝑖 and 𝑗 is proportional to the reciprocal of their geodesic
distance. For obtaining the general efficiency of the whole
network, performance between each pair of nodes should be
assessed to calculate an average value.
However, when applying this metric to evaluate power
grids, the original concept of distance in (1) is not meaningful
in electrical engineering [2, 4, 30]. Distance in power grids
should be adjusted as the ability to overcome difficulties
of transferring power between the pair of generator node𝑔 and load node 𝑑. Through considering the economic
and technical aspects, power transmission difficulties should
depend both on power flow capacity and on impedance.
According to the electrical circuit theory, the equivalent
impedance between bus 𝑔 and bus 𝑑 can be expressed as
𝑍𝑑𝑔 = 𝑈𝑑𝑔𝐼𝑔 = 𝑧𝑔𝑔 − 2𝑧𝑔𝑑 + 𝑧𝑑𝑑. (2)
𝑧𝑔𝑔, 𝑧𝑔𝑑, and 𝑧𝑑𝑑 are corresponding elements of the
impedance matrix of the network.
Furthermore, the maximum power flow limit from 𝑔 to 𝑑
should also be considered, which can be calculated as
𝐶𝑑𝑔 = min
𝑙∈𝐿
(𝐶max𝑙󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑓𝑔𝑑𝑙 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨) . (3)
𝐶𝑑𝑔 is power transmission capacity between the generator-
load (𝑔-d) pair. 𝐿 is the set of all lines connecting 𝑔 and𝑑; 𝐶max𝑙 is the maximum power flow capacity for line 𝑙; 𝑓𝑔𝑑𝑙
is the power transfer and distribution factor (PTDF) when
transferring power from bus 𝑔 to 𝑑. PTDF here has overcome
the assumption of transferring physical quantity only through
the shortest path in global efficiency. Therefore, with the new
definition of distance in power grids and taking into account
power flow capacity characterized by PTDF, net-ability for
power transmission network was defined as [3, 4, 9]
𝐴 (Y) = 1𝑁𝐺𝑁𝐷 ∑𝑔∈𝐺∑𝑑∈𝐷
𝐶𝑑𝑔𝑍𝑑𝑔 . (4)
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𝐺 and 𝐷 are, respectively, the sets of generator buses and
load buses. 𝑁𝐺 is the number of generator buses and 𝑁𝐷 is
the number of loads buses.
With fast development of smart grid technologies, dis-
tribution networks with DGs and BESS have become a hot
topic in research and engineering. However, up to now, pure
structural analysis has seldom been applied to this field. In
fact, the evaluation of power supply security with penetration
of DGs and BESS is meaningful and necessary; and site
allocation for DGs and BESS from structural perspective can
also contribute to real system planning and operation.
Although net-ability has been applied to evaluate struc-
ture vulnerabilities of power transmission network as an
effective approach, it is not reasonable to directly apply it for
modern distribution networks.
Firstly, only the capacity of transmission channel between
any pair of generator bus and load bus was considered,
because net-ability only targeted features of network and
did not consider generators or loads as a part of networks.
However, the power capacities of power sources and loads
may impact on the final power supply performance if they
aremuch different from the capacity of channel, especially for
distribution networks where the capacities of power sources
are not comparable with transmission networks. Therefore,
the connotation of structural analysis should not be limited
to pure topological features but should also include some
static physical features of devices, such as capacities of power
sources and BESS.
Secondly, in definition of net-ability, all generator buses
are supposed to have large capacity to support long distance
transmission, so any generator can be a power source for
any load bus in the same network. However, in distribution
networks, most DGs have much smaller power capacity and
may only be effective power sources for a range of local loads.
Therefore, DGs cannot be considered as equal power sources
in set 𝐺 with other traditional sources and cannot be an
effective power source for any load bus in the network.
Thirdly, most DGs are renewable power generation, such
as wind power or solar power. The output power of such
power sources greatly depends on the availability of primary
energy. Therefore, with intermittency and fluctuation, these
power sources cannot supply continuous full rated output
power for any required time period. Similar problem exists
for BESS, which have to operate in charging and discharging
modes in turn and cannot supply continuous full rated power
for any required time period. As these features can seriously
impact on the power supply performance of the distribution
networks, they should not be neglected in structural analysis.
3. Power-Supply-Ability for
Distribution Networks
To address the problems mentioned above, a new metric
named as Power-Supply-Ability (PSA) dedicated to distribu-
tion networks is proposed based on net-ability.
To address the first problem mentioned in Section 2, the
capacity of power source will be compared with the capacity
of transmission channel defined in (3), and theminimumone
will be applied in evaluating Power-Supply-Ability:
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔, 𝐶𝑔)𝑍𝑑𝑔 . (5)
If the capacity of power source is smaller than the channel
capacity, that means the channel capacity cannot be fully
utilized by the power source, so it cannot be directly used in
evaluating Power-Supply-Ability.
As for the second problem in Section 2, with development
of renewable technology, focus of environmental-friendly
energy, and demand/supply balance, new generation tech-
nologies of DG such as wind generation and energy storage
are gradually considered in distribution networks [17, 31,
32]. However, according to their common small capacities
[32, 33] and power generating efficiency, they should not be
directly evaluated as above conventional power sources. So in
definition of PSA, DGs will only be considered as backup or
auxiliary power sources to improve power supply reliability
and quality, which cannot be considered in a source-load pair
in average calculation, but just as an additional compensation
for a conventional source-load pair.Therefore, the net-ability
can be extended as
PSA (Y) = 1𝑁𝐺𝑁𝐷
{{{∑𝑔∈𝐺[[∑𝑑∈𝐷(
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔, 𝐶𝑔)𝑍𝑑𝑔 + ∑𝑔𝐵∈𝐺𝑑𝐵
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔𝐵 , 𝐶𝑔𝐵)𝑍𝑑𝑔𝐵 )]]
}}} , (6)
where 𝐺𝑑𝐵 is the set of DG buses which are effective power
sources for load bus 𝑑. And 𝐶𝑔𝐵 is capacity of DG at bus𝑔𝐵; 𝐶𝑑𝑔𝐵 is power transmission capacity from bus 𝑔𝐵 to load𝑑, which can also be calculated by (3). 𝑍𝑑𝑔𝐵 is the equivalent
impedance between 𝑔𝐵 and the supplied load bus 𝑑. The
metric of net-ability calculates average network performance
for all possible (generation + load) pairs. PSA considers a power
supply layout in terms of main power source + load + auxiliary
sources and calculates average power supply performance for
all possible power supply layouts. This means that when
considering the power supply of one pair (𝑔-d), additional
power supply from local power supplies (DGs) to that load𝑑will also be considered to improve the supply performance.
Since DGs in (6) are considered to have small capacities
in this paper, it implies that DGs could not serve any load in
the network like conventional power sources. It then needs a
method to identify effective DG power sources 𝐺𝑑𝐵 for a load
bus 𝑑. From another point of view, we can say that we need
a method to identify effective supply area of a DG bus 𝑔𝐵.
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Figure 1: Sketch for effective supply area of DGs.
Then𝐺𝑑𝐵 is the set of DG buses whose supply areas all include
load 𝑑. When considering effective supply area of DGs, the
general idea is that, with the same impedance, higher power
supply capacity increases the efficient supplying area; with the
same power supply capacity, higher impendence reduces the
efficient supplying area. Then, a criterion to identify effective
supply area for a DG bus is proposed as
𝑍𝑑𝑔𝐵
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔𝐵 , 𝐶𝑔𝐵) ≤ 𝛾, 𝑔𝐵 ̸= 𝑑. (7)
All DGs from𝐺𝑑𝐵 satisfy criterion𝑍𝑑𝑔𝐵/min(𝐶𝑑𝑔𝐵 , 𝐶𝑔𝐵) ≤ 𝛾
and 𝑔𝐵 ̸= 𝑑. To be specific, when the criterion is satisfied,
it means that the DG has the ability to supply power to
load d with acceptable power quality. 𝑔𝐵 ̸= 𝑑 means that
when analyzing power supplied to load 𝑑, any DG directly
installed at load bus 𝑑 will not be evaluated. The reason is
that PSA in this paper is to evaluate the distribution network;
once the DGs are placed at the load bus 𝑑, to some degree,
they could not be considered as a part of network because
their interactions are not through the network frame, and the
power supply from these DGs to load 𝑑 should be considered
as an internal supply, which is isolated from the whole system
performance. Additionally, 𝛾 is a parameter to define the
DG supply area and it should be a value based on statistical
analysis and simulation.
Figure 1 is a sketch to explain the meaning of effective
supply area and power supply layout. A main power source
G and a load bus D can be considered as a generation + load
pair. There are three different DGs in the figure. Each DG
could be considered as the center of a circle whose radius is𝛾. The circles could be considered as the effective area of each
DG.The load bus D is inside the circles of DG1 and DG2 but
outside of the circle of DG3. That means DG1 and DG2 are
all effective auxiliary sources for D and should be included
in 𝐺𝑑𝐵. And DG3 is not an effective auxiliary source for D; it
should not be included in 𝐺𝑑𝐵. So the corresponding power
supply layout could be (G + D + DG1 + DG2).
To address the third problem mentioned in Section 2, as
some renewableDGs andBESS cannot supply continuous full
rated power, a power supply factor is introduced:
𝜂 = 𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑃 = Equivalent Supply Time at Rated PowerTotal Time of One period . (8)
For a DG or BESS with rated power 𝑃, suppose, in one
calculating period 𝑇𝑃, the accumulated output energy is 𝐸𝑃;
then the equivalent supply time at rated power during this
period can be calculated as
𝑇𝑆 = 𝐸𝑃𝑃 . (9)
This is amethod to unify allmain power sources,DGs and
BESS systems. For example, for a main power source 𝑔, such
as a distribution substation which has ability to supply rated
power during any required time period, the corresponding
power supply factor 𝜂𝑔 is equal to 1. This will not influence
the calculation of net-ability. But for some DGs and BESS,
this power supply factor needs to be calculated according
to statistical data. For a wind power generator or PV panel,
this needs to select a long term period with corresponding
weather information and actual output energy statistical data.
For BESS, the system needs specific time for charging and
then to make discharging for some time. The power supply
factor should be calculated based on an average charging and
discharging period.
Furthermore, the power supply factor is an indicator to
reflect the ability of a power source to make continuous rated
power supply but not description for real operating state. For
example, a main power source (distribution substation) may
have power supply factor of 1 meaning ability to supply rated
power for any required time period, but it does not mean it
always operates at rated power for any time.
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With this power supply factor, PSA can be finally defined
as
PSA (Y) = 1𝑁𝐺𝑁𝐷
{{{∑𝑔∈𝐺[[∑𝑑∈𝐷(𝜂𝑔
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔, 𝐶𝑔)𝑍𝑑𝑔 + ∑𝑔𝐵∈𝐺𝑑𝐵𝜂𝑔𝐵
min (𝐶𝑑𝑔𝐵 , 𝐶𝑔𝐵)𝑍𝑑𝑔𝐵 )]]
}}} (𝑔 ̸= 𝑑, 𝑔𝐵 ̸= 𝑑) . (10)
Similar to calculation for net-ability, the relative change
of PSA after removal of components can help to indicate
the most important components in the targeted distribution
network:
ΔPSA = PSA (𝑌) − PSA (𝑌 − 1)
PSA (𝑌) , (11)
where PSA(𝑌 − 1) represents the Power-Supply-Ability of
distribution network after one component is removed andΔPSA is the relative drop of PSA normalized by PSA(𝑌)
to identify critical components of a network. Higher value
of ΔPSA implies that this component is more critical and
removal of it could result in severer negative effects.Thus, this
component needs more protection.
4. Overall Ability of Networks for
DG Integration
In the field of complex networks, it has been widely acknowl-
edged that the performance and vulnerabilities of networked
infrastructures are tightly related to the original topology
and structure. Furthermore, in analyzing performance and
security issues for power grids, topology and extended
structural factors, such as positions of generation and load
buses, capacities of transmission lines, and contributions
of all paths in power transmission have been taken into
account. However, up to now, few research works have
considered DGs in terms of their positions and capacities as
structural factors and evaluated their possible contributions
in improving network performance and security. This is the
original motivation to propose PSA.
However, it is important to point out that such improve-
ments are from bidirectional interactions between the orig-
inal networks and the integrated DGs. Therefore, the final
effects may depend not only on the features of DGs, but
also on some inherent features of the original networks. In
these inherent features, topology and structural factors of
the original networks are very important. Therefore, there
should be two different perspectives to consider the issues
about integration ofDGswith distribution networks.Thefirst
perspective is at a local level and from individual viewpoint
of DGs to discuss possible optimal deployment and operation
of DGs with structural factors as given conditions. The
second perspective should be at a global level and from
overall viewpoint of original networks to discuss the inherent
potential abilities of networks about how their performance
and security can be improved by penetration of DGs. That
is to say, with the same extents of DG penetration, the
extents of improvement for different distribution networks
may be different due to their inherent characteristics, such
as topology and structure. Up to now, most existent works
related toDGswere from the first perspective; fewworkswere
from the second perspective or even aware of its existence.
In this paper, we will propose methodologies based on PSA
to evaluate and compare this inherent potential of networks
from the second perspective.
The inherent potential abilities of networks for improve-
ment by DG penetration are related to two aspects, that is,
network performance and security.The first issue is to discuss
how the network static performance can be improved by
same extent of DG penetration.The second issue is to discuss
how the vulnerabilities of the networks can be reduced by
penetration of DGs.
For the first issue, to make overall evaluation, two
networks can be considered, the original network 𝑌 and a
modified network 𝑌 + 𝑇. In 𝑌 + 𝑇, we suppose all buses of𝑌 are connected to DGs with same power supply factor and
capacity; then the variance of PSA before and after adding
these DGs could be used to evaluate the original system
structure for its inherent ability to be improved by DGs.
Alternatively, we may suppose a unique DG with given
power supply factor and capacity is connected to each bus
of 𝑌 in turn; the increase of PSA corresponding to each bus
could be used to evaluate which one may be the best location
to install a DG. But, furthermore, we may also calculate the
average value of increase in PSA for all buses to make overall
evaluation for inherent ability of the network.
Both methods can be applied jointly to indicate the
inherent ability of the network.The former one ismainly from
an overall and accumulated point of view; the second one is
mainly from an average point of view.
For the second issue, the vulnerability of the original
network can be characterized by the relative drop of PSA
calculated by (11); then the vulnerability of network 𝑌 can be
defined as
VUL (𝑌) = max
𝑙∈𝐿
{PSA (𝑌) − PSA (𝑌 − 𝑙)
PSA (𝑌) } . (12)
The most critical line 𝑙𝑚 can be identified as correspond-
ing to the maximum PSA drop in (12). Similar to the former
ideas, DGs with same power supply factor and capacity can
be added to all buses of network 𝑌, which can be indicated
as 𝑌 + 𝑇. In 𝑌 + 𝑇, we can also calculate its maximum drop
of PSA by (12). So this variance of PSA drop can reflect the
original overall ability of the network to be improved for its
security by adding DGs.
To give more detailed information, the adding of DGs
can be performed according to the importance sequence of
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Figure 2: Ranking of branch in UKGDS 86.
buses step by step. The importance sequence is the sequence
from larger to smaller PSA for different (𝑌 + 𝐷𝐺𝑖). This may
give direct expression of impacts from DGs on security for
different locations.
For given networks, these methods can jointly evaluate
and discover their difference in potential abilities to be
improved by DG penetration. This can help analysis and
decisions in overall planning and investment related to DG
penetration. Possible application of these methods is that
when limited resources of DG are given, if one distribution
network needs to be selected from two or several candidate
networks to install these DG resources, these methods can
help to determine which one is the best choice according
to their original structure features. And, furthermore, this
also can help to identify structural bottlenecks of distribution
networks in DG development.
5. Case Study
In this section, the PSA is applied to the IEEE-33-bus system
and a real distribution network UKGDS 86. UKGDS 86
initially is tested without DGs and it will be assessed to com-
pare and analyze corresponding power supply performance
through PSA.The initial PSA for UKGDS 86 without DGs is
calculated as
PSA (UKGDS 86) = 57.1253. (13)
When removing one branch from UKGDS 86, perfor-
mance of power supply could be evaluated through PSA(𝑌 −1) metric and relative drop ΔPSA could be used to rank the
critical lines.
As in Table 1, once a branch is removed, it could result in
decreases in PSA. For better visual effect, rankings are shown
in Figure 2.
The red numbers in red circles represent five branches
which would result in significant PSA drops once removed
and need more protection. As is shown, these branches
mainly occur close to power station. It seems that branches
near power station play significant roles in power supply;
removal of them would influence performance of the whole
Table 1: Critical branches rankings in UKGDS 86.
PSAinitial(𝑌) = 57.1253ΔPSA (𝑌) = PSA (𝑌) − PSA (𝑌 − 1)
PSA (𝑌)
Rank Branch PSA ΔPSA
1 2-4 14.426 0.747467
2 2-3 17.125 0.70022
3 2-13 17.144 0.699888
4 4-5 17.385 0.695669
5 3-4 17.572 0.692395
6 2-14 17.977 0.685306
7 13-15 18.193 0.681525
8 15-14 18.193 0.681525
9 4-8 18.589 0.674593
10 8-9 18.589 0.674593
11 4-6 18.72 0.672299
12 9-10 19.103 0.665595
13 6-7 19.32 0.661796
14 10-11 19.531 0.658102
15 10-12 19.57 0.65742
16 15-16 19.724 0.654724
systemmore severely and needmore protection for grid secu-
rity. Branches in blue, which are relevantly away from power
station and near loads, will cause less negative consequences
when they are removed.
When adding same DGs to each bus, which means there
are now totally 16 DGs in network, PSA value of this new grid
increases to 62.721. Similar to above analysis, branches of this
grid are ranked and labeled as in Figure 3.
As is shown in Figure 3 comparing with former con-
ventional network without DGs, removal of branches results
in similar rankings. Only branch 2-3 and branch 4-5 have
exchanged ranks, which are labeled in Figure 3, but they
still keep top five as former. So installation of DGs can
improve power supply performance of the network but does
not change the protection properties of branches too much.
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Figure 4: PSAs for adding one DG at different buses.
Branches near power distribution station still need more
attention for security.
To quantitatively identify which buses are best sites for
installation of DG, one DG can be installed on each bus
in turn and the corresponding increase of PSA is shown in
Figure 4.
It shows that bus 4 is the best location for locating DG
and bus 12 is the relevantly worst. Based on this, the first
DG should be suggested to be located on bus 4 and then
the second one will be added at bus 5. Through considering
overall performance, bus 12 with worst PSA = 57.19 will be
lastly planned to add a DG.
Based on the order in Figure 4, DGs are added one by
one for further observation of DG influence. As is shown,
initially there is no DG; based on orders in Figure 3, the first
DG will be added to bus 4 and then add the second DG at
bus 5. AddDGs one by one under above suggestion order and
record relative PSA drops (ΔPSA) of (12) during DG addition
procedure.
From Figures 2 and 3, branch 2-4 is the most critical line
and needs the most protection. Thus, this branch is selected
in Figure 5 to observeΔPSAs under different number of DGs.
Figure 5 shows that, with increases of DGs, they generally
decrease ΔPSA; in other words, addition of local power sup-
plies could improve power grids performance and decrease
the vulnerability of critical lines. At the beginning, the curve
is steeper and indicates that the adding of DGs at beginning
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Figure 5: ΔPSA of branch 2-4 with different DGs.
could obviously reduce system vulnerabilities. However, at
the end of the curve, it becomes flat and indicates that the
effect of adding DGs becomes weak step by step.
Furthermore, an ideal small-scale generation with power
supply factor of 1 is utilized to test IEEE-33-bus system
and compare with analytical methods reported earlier [34]
through considering improvement of voltage profile and
reduction of losses.
In Figure 6, the 𝑦-axis of ranking represents the per-
formance of DG installation, the minimum number means
best performance, and the largest number means the worst
performance. For instance, in purple line, when DG location
is 5, its priority ranking is 1 and it means that installing DG
to bus location 5 will improve performance most.
There are three lines in Figure 6, the blue line is the
ranking results from PSA metric in this paper, which is
based on structural analysis. While voltage stability index
and Exhaustive Load Flow Method (ELF) [34–36] are based
on detailed power flow calculations, involving detailed load
voltages, generator voltages, and load currents. These meth-
ods consider that addition of DGs may increase real power
flow back to system and then cause voltage rise or may
increase reactive power follow into feeder and then cause
voltage to fall [34–36]. Thus, reduction of losses, which is
aimed at minimizing total power losses and improvement of
voltage stability, is the main purpose for these methods to
consider DG optimum location. To some extent, methods
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Figure 6: PSAs for installing DGs at different buses.
based on states pay more attention to economy and quality
while PSA method based on structural analysis focuses on
overall performance and security.
In other words, analyses based on operating states could
not consider all possible system operative states through
calculating and they mostly focus on economy through
limited situations. However, security analysis should pay
attention to emergencies such as intentional attacks, which
are not the common conditions. Thus, safety analysis and
above economic analysis have contradictions.
Since analyzing aspects of three methods are different,
there are variances of rankings in Figure 6. However, there
are still some installation locations with relevantly smaller
priority variances. For these locations, they contain both
aspects of security and aspects of economy and quality, which
are more meaningful.
In Figure 7, bus locations 25, 5, and 26 have high rankings
from perspectives of economy, quality, and security, which
should be firstly suggested to install DGs while bus locations
13, 14, and 21 have low performance from three perspectives
and may not be recommended to add DGs. There are also
inconsistent locations such as bus locations 6, 9, 10, and 28.
That means evaluation by limited operational states cannot
identify possible problems in security analysis which is the
contribution of the measure from this paper.
6. Conclusions
Structural analysis based on complex network theory has
been considered promising for analyzing security issues
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of power grids. However, the meaning of “structure” has
normally been limited to topological connections or some
related physical features of networks. In fact, in broad sense,
some static physical features of related components may also
have tight relation with network performance, such as capac-
ities, effective supply area, or intermittency of generators.
Many effective metrics of complex networks are based on
statistic evaluation. And these static physical features can also
provide great valuable information from statistic perspective.
Therefore, it is inevitable that thesemore static features would
be integrated with network structures when the targeted
issues are more specific and professional.
At the same time, with fast development of smart grid
technology, modern power distribution networks with more
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DGs and BESS have taken on more challenges in operation
and security issues. By consideration of some specific defects
of former metrics for distribution networks and DGs, it is
necessary to update related methodologies by some further
important and special features to extend the meaning of
structural analysis. This paper proposed a dedicated metric
named as Power-Supply-Ability for power distribution net-
works based on net-ability which was formerly applied to
power transmission networks. Three defects of net-ability
applying to distribution networks with DGs are identified.
Based on solutions to these defects, the net-ability is updated
and refined as Power-Supply-Ability for distribution net-
works. Furthermore, it is pointed out that it is an inher-
ent ability depending on the original network structure to
improve its performance and security by same extent of DG
penetration. Through case studies, this method has been
proved to be effective in identifying potential structural vul-
nerabilities of distribution networks. Furthermore, it can help
in site allocation for DGs and complementing other methods
which are only based on limited analysis of states.The analysis
and judgment for DG plan and operation should consider
perspectives of economy, quality, and security. This metric
can help to construct a more comprehensive methodology.
In the future, this method will try to be applied to real world
systems in decision of DG allocation for further development
and analysis.
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